to maintain their Lebanese citizenship abroad are Christians, the overwhelming majority of whom are Maronites.

(c) The natural increase among the non-Christian population of the Lebanon, and particularly of the Shi'ah and the Druze, is more than twice as great as that of the Christian population. These facts are stressed as a key to explain various developments, the influence of which may be decisive in shaping the social character and political fate of the Lebanon.

Any person reviewing the demographic problems of the Lebanon cannot but observe a number of basic elements in the Christian population of the Lebanon and the Yishuv (the Jewish community) in Palestine. The natural increase of the Christians in the Lebanon is roughly equal to that of the Yishuv in Palestine.*

Against this, however, the Yishuv in Palestine has incomparably more potential reserve in the way of immigration from abroad than that which is available to the Lebanese Christians through the return of emigrants. And just as the chief concern of Zionism in Palestine is the creation of possibilities for the absorption of Jewish immigrants from abroad, so the Christians of the Lebanon are faced first and foremost with the problem of preventing emigration from the country, and, in consequence, the creation of opportunities for absorbing emigrants who do return and who can return to their homeland, given suitable absorptive conditions. In addition, attention is devoted to the creation of opportunities for absorbing Christians who require a refuge.

The absence of dynamic economic resources in the Lebanon which could increase and expand the sources of livelihood for a progressive population has led to a steady emigration from the country since the middle of the last century. This process has chiefly affected the Christians whose requirements are more developed and whose living standards are higher than those of their Druze and Moslem neighbours; it has created a serious social and political problem which, when together with their lower rate of natural increase, places the future of the Lebanese Christians in permanent danger.

Robert Widmer described the economic reasons for a migration from the Lebanon in the following passage:†

> "Lebanon is over-populated. As has been stated, the density of population is about 93 people to a square kilometre. In view of the topography of the country, its rocky mountains and its thin soil, its scarcity of mineral wealth, and its undeveloped industries, the land cannot support all its people. Consequently it is to be expected that some of them have to emigrate, leaving many dependents on their remittances."

As long as emigration was temporary, it was to many more advantageous. For the general broadening of outlook resulting from contact with more advanced countries were added the economic benefits of an influx of money to the country's capital (brought in by returning emigrants), an addition

* Previous preamble among the Christians of the Lebanon is against those generally among the Jews of Palestine.

† R. Widmer, *Economic Organization of Syria*, Beirut, 1936, p. 14.

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the village imports it provides manufactured goods, and the village supplies the city with food. Fisher concludes:

> From data from elsewhere, clearly integrated by material and cultural ties, he writes the primary complex pattern of society in the Middle East, and it is on this basis that we can proceed to study the region as a whole. As a tapestry or patterning owes its special character to an intermingling of diverse color strands, so the Middle East can be considered as a unity based on a number of distinctive yet related ways of life. (Ibid., p. 436.)

A recent paper by Patai (1992) deals with important aspects of this same topic.

Cora brings a functional approach to bear on the situation, to which he gives a name, the "mosaic system." His specific view is that the mosaic system is based on an ethnic division of labor:

> . . . the ideal was to emphasize not the uniformity of the citizens of a country as a whole but a uniformity within each special segment, and the greatest possible contrast between segments. The members of each ethnic unit feel the need to identify themselves by some configuration of symbols. If by virtue of their history they possess some social peculiarity, this they will enhance by special behavior and the like; in any case they will wear distinctive garments and behave in distinctive fashion. Working through the homes you have an erudite identifying everyone you meet, once you have learned the use of symbols. These people must to be identified. If you know who they are, you will know what to expect of them and how to deal with them, and human relations will operate smoothly in a crowded space. . . . Obviously the mosaic system is best suited for a civilization in which cradle neglect a maximum of skill, taught from father to son, and a minimum of organizational complexity. (Cora, 1970, pp. 5, 10n.)

Cora's interest is primarily in how the mosaic system is made to work in face-to-face contact situations. Such situations, when they involve members of different elements in the mosaic, are generally economic, that is, trade relationships. Economic, or subsistence, needs necessarily override temporarily in any given interaction the divisive pull of sanguinary hatred and suspicion. They do, that is, if they are successful and complete transactions. Since most Middle East cities owe their very existence to the fact that they are long-standing trading centers, where members of every element in the mosaic have interacted more or less peaceably, it is clear that group coexistence can be, and have been, for a long time, sometimes successfully. But they have not been dishonored; indeed, they maintain their vigor. The fact of the matter seems to be that they can be "forgotten," or if seen, only on an individual basis, and temporarily, in the interest of a transient need, of which economic need is a prominent example.

David Aberle has come near the point at issue, referring it to the problem of the "integration of sub-systems with diverse values, within the total social system" (1970, p. 464). In this connection, he points to the coexistence of Catholics,

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Protestants, and Jews in the United States, and says that toleration depends in part on the special position of each not being actual discrimination in the eyes of the others (ibid., p. 497). In other words, disparate values cannot be too disparate, if the groups are to interact at all. The individual's religious role, per se, must not exclude him from full participation in other cosmological role systems (ibid., p. 498). Applied to the Middle East, we may paraphrase Hsieh in terms of Cantril's analysis, by saying that the diverse sect affiliations of Middle Easterners do not prevent them from interacting successfully with each other in the cosmological role system of the marketplace.

However, the phenomenon of intense in-group cohesion and out-group hostilities remains as one of paramount importance. We must still deal with a system in which a large number of individuals apparently approach their social relationships with an attitude which can be summed up by the following Lebanese village saying: "I am against my brother; my brother and I are against my cousin; my cousin, my brother, and I are against the stranger" (Thomas, 1948b, p. 350).

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Prothro and Melikian, psychologists on the faculty of the American University of Beirut, have recently reported on a social distance test which they administered to one hundred and thirty students in the University. In the test, social distance was put in terms of attitudes toward sect and national groups, primarily. Their general conclusion is that social distance between groups are greater than in the United States, "but they reflect, in general, reserve toward out-groups rather than an elaborate class-hierarchy system" (Prothro and Melikian, 1952, pp. 10-11).

But if we are to analyze the in-group system of the Middle East, a class-hierarchy device is precisely what we must have. For, with a multiplicity of loyalties and aspirations impinging upon the emotions of every average individual, there is excellent reason to inquire why (1) anarchy does not prevail in the Middle East, and (2) why the average individual is not torn by irreconcilable conflicts. The answer to the first question is that anarchy very frequently does prevail in the Middle East or large sections of it. To answer the second question and to explain why anarchy does not always prevail in every part of the Middle East, we must put the events, or in-group, system into a more theoretical frame of reference than we have done so far.

THE CONCEPT OF SPHERES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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The following theoretical analysis of the complex social structure of the Middle East is based, in part, on the theory of "balanced antagonisms," and the associated theory of "group segmentation," which Evans-Pritchard developed in his study of the Nuer (1940).

Evans-Pritchard describes the overall social structure of the Sudanese Nuer tribe as a distinct cultural unity whose relations with its immediate neighbors are typically hostile; as an "amphictonic kinship state" (1940, p. 181). The society is

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: THE SUBSIDIARY GROUPS

621 The group called *Peripheral to the Core* is rather heterogeneous, and it is not intensely unified. It includes three house servants, one of whom is a Druze, another a Maronite, while the religion of the third was not ascertained. Both of the laborers in the village has a professional father and both of these men are included in the Peripheral Group. One is a Maronite from Jbeil, and he is the brother of the husband of a member of one of the Affiliate Families of the Core Group. The other is a Sunni Muslim who has his wife and one small child with him in the village.

Three members of the Peripheral Group are outsiders to the village in terms of religion and local origin. There is only one affinal tie with the Core Group, and it is with a family whose Core Group status is marginal.

The remaining seven members of the Peripheral Group consist of a single nuclear family, parents and five children. This group is Greek Orthodox in religion, and it came from Ayrs about five years previous to the study. The father does agricultural wage labor. Between this family and the Core Group there is no religious barrier, but it is not a part of the Core Group because of its immediate outside origin and because it has no kinship or marriage connections with the Core Group. Its very presence in the village was discovered only after the period of study had been under way for some time, and explanations were supplied by Core Group informants only in response to questions put by the investigator.

621 The *B'noonee* are all Maronites (Lebanese Roman Catholics). They are sharp and 231 good herders who regularly drive their flocks down to Mamjé every October from the 232 two high villages of which they are members, which are buried in snow all winter. They 233 return to the high slopes in April. They are all united by their religion, and each village 234 group is particularly cohesive because it is a village group and because of kinship and marriage ties. From the village of Jaaj there are three residence units: (1) a nuclear family consisting of father, mother, one son, and two daughters; (2) an adult, single man and his mother; (3) a brother of the single man, his wife, five sons and three daughters. From the village Ehmij there are, first of all, two independent nuclear families. One of these (parents, one son, and two daughters) lives in the village proper; the other (parents and several children) lives at 'Araja. Also from Ehmij is a family which is headed by two adult brothers and is known, as a group, by the name of their father. One brother lives in the village proper with his wife and, sometimes, two sons and their wives. The other brother lives at Ehmij with his wife and several children. It was stated that the members of this family are *shirkeyn* (partners), that is to say, the property of the brothers is not divided and they pool their resources.

621 The *Mawâli* (designation of the Lebanese Shi'a Muslims) consist of three house-
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holds and in order to describe the relationships between them, capital letters will be used to designate individuals. From the village of Fidar (south of Jbeil on the main highway) there are two households: (1) A, his wife, and his mother B; (2) C, his wife D, and three children. From the village of Hjoula (southward and inland from Beirut) there is one household consisting of E, his wife, an unmarried daughter, a son F, and F's wife G. 621 563

E, now a widow, was married twice. By her first husband she bore C. By her second husband she bore A and G. At one time, E's second husband was married to another woman, and from this union there came D who is C's wife. In other words, C's mother was once the wife of his wife's (D's) father. C is the half-brother of A and G who are full siblings. D is a half-sister of A and G, and by stretching things a little one might be able to say that she is a step-sister of her husband (C).

This information came to light as the result of a Core Group informant's comment that C and his wife were brother and sister. After the explanation had been made, the informant said, "Well, they *call* each other brother and sister sometimes." The relationship clearly evoked humor, but it is possible that lurking beneath the humor was a feeling that the connection was a little too close for comfort in the eyes of the Christians. 588 189

The presence and various activities in Munsif of the Peripheral Group, the Witnesses, and the Jehovah's are, with one exception, concrete evidence of the *ethnic division of labor* which, in Cohn's view (1951), accounts for so many of the salient characteristics of Middle East culture. With this view the present writer is in essential agreement, and a full discussion of its theoretical significance for this study is presented in the chapter "Some Theoretical Considerations." 463

In this instance, the ethnic distinctions are primarily religious in nature. This conforms with the general pattern of the phenomenon, but there are lacking in Munsif most of the visible cultural differentiations, such as costume, which are often so conspicuous elsewhere. One reason for the homogeneity of appearance in Munsif is the fact that nearly everyone concerned is from the same rather small region, Northern Lebanon, although several different communities are represented.

It has been noted that there are really two classes of people in the Peripheral Group. One of these, the Greek Orthodox nuclear family from Syria, represents the kind of internal migration which is of common occurrence in the region. Long ago, a similar group by a similar action established the community itself. With respect to the Core Group, the Orthodox family in the Peripheral Group really does not exemplify Cohn's ethnic division of labor. The remainder of the Peripheral Group do, however. They differ among themselves, and with respect to the Core Group, in the important matter of religion. Also, they are outsiders to the local group. In terms of the structural theory which is presented in the chapter, "Some Theoretical Considerations," each is a representative of a more widely distributed segment of Sphere 4 (Sect Group) within another, locally established, Sphere 4 segment which is itself an enclave in the area of another segment of Sphere 4. Functionally, all these members of the Peripheral Group serve the Core Group as hired hands in capacities which are generally regarded as menial. It was quite evident that members of the Core Group would be very unwilling to serve each other in such capacities. 461

What is true of members of the Peripheral Group as individuals is essentially true

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of the Wimmen and the Mawali as groups. The Wimmen are tradesmen, representing an activity which is of frequent occurrence along the slopes of Mount Lebanon (cf. Thesiger, 1954, pp. 139–51). According to Core Group informants, they, or other Marwanies like them, have always come to the village in winter. They live either in vacant houses or in the lower sections of occupied houses. Their presence in the village is primarily in their own interest which is the need for winter pasturage for their sheep and goats. Moreover, the Core Group has everything to gain and nothing to lose by their being in the village. The flocks furnish a convenient extra supply of meat and milk, some of the men hire themselves out for farm labor, they pay rent for their dwellings, and the children attend both of the village schools.

The Mawali are looked upon with some disapproval. The Mawali as a group have been in the village since about 1940, and there was no one comparable to them before that in the village. The men are specialists in preparing charcoal for sale, (mostly outside the village) and for this they cut the scrub oak which is fairly abundant in the village territory. They pay a prearranged sum to the owners of the property on which they cut the wood. Evidently this sum is agreed upon with a view to the Core Group members' getting a fair return relative to the profits of the Mawali, and some bitterness in regard to the way this arrangement worked out was indicated. The women of this group either work in the balconies or hire themselves out part time as domestic servants or laundresses. The children attend the village schools.

It might be tempting to classify these groups as castes. In terms of such traits as ethnic (religious) division of labor, absence of intermarriage, and occasional suggestions of superiority-inferiority judgments they indeed look something like castes. Most emphatically, however, they are not, at least not in the sense in which the term is applied to the characteristic social groups of India. This opinion is founded upon the following considerations: In the first place, in other Lebanese villages representative groups of the same sects live together in entirely different orders of dominance. There is nothing inherent in the nature of any of the sects which makes one necessarily dominant over another. The crucial factor is simply the relative degree of numerical superiority and local establishment which obtain in the particular area. In other words, as has been suggested above, Mansif is simply one localized example of the operation of Gulick's ethnic division of labor and the present writer's own theory of "spheres." In the second place, as far as was observed, social interaction is in no way colored by group avoidances or any such concept as pollution through social contact. The general tendency in *all* social relationships in the village is equalitarian, combined, to be sure, with the various functions which are consequences of the system of "spheres."

It should be noted that the village is regularly visited by two types of itinerants: (1) Tinkers and scissors grinders, who announce their arrival in the village with special cries of the type which contribute greatly to the liveliness of the streets in the cities. They go from house to house and do whatever jobs they are given on the spot. (2) Various types of people all of whom are classed as beggars and of whom it is said, "They do not work, they have no homes, they are thieves and liars." Some are beggars outright; others seek, perhaps sincerely, to find work as servants. Notable among the true beggars are the Nawaar (Gypsies). One group of them was observed—three women in distinctive costumes, including circular head-dress, their faces tattooed, marching up the road with

432. Where there is a religious group of Armenians, they are entitled to representation on the council by the addition of members over and above the regular number in proportion to their relative numerical importance in the community.[1]

433. The councils are elected for a term of four years and are renewed as a unit. Municipal elections take place on the third Sunday of May in electoral years.[2]

434.

Basis of Representation.

Proportional religious representation is secured by the apportionment of the council seats among the various religious sects in conformity with their relative numerical strength in the electoral list.[3] Thus it is a fixed ratio based on potential voting strength rather than population figures. The allocation of seats is made by decree of the administrator subject to the approval of the Minister of the Interior. All electors vote for all the positions to be filled in their ward or municipality so that the votes of a majority sect may determine the choice of representatives for minority seats. One seat is reserved for minority sects having at least half but less than a whole electoral quotient. The allocation of seats is effected by the "list system" of proportional representation, the method being applied to registration rather than voting figures.

435. Qualifications for membership in the municipal councils are the same as for a seat in the national assembly as determined by Arrêté No. 1807 of March 10, 1932.[4] [Candidates must be Lebanese citizens, at least twenty five years of age, literate, and in the enjoyment of full civil and political rights.[5] Aside from the general restrictions of the electoral law, the municipal law of 1922 expressly disqualifies the following :—

1. Those deprived of their franchise.
2. Persons under tutelage or supervision of judicial council.
3. Persons exempted from municipal taxes or aided by any charitable organization.

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1 Loi du 11 Mars 1930, Journ. Off. No. 441, p. 2.

2 Arrêté No. 2320, 10 Fev. 1926, Journ. Off., No. F. 288.

3 Arrêté No. 1388, 10 Fev. 1926, Journ. Off., No. F. 288, Art. 10.

4 Arrêté No. 1388, loc. cit., Art. 12.

5 Recueil des Actes Administratifs du Haut Commissariat, Supplement 2me Ann. Beyrouth), Vol. III, p. 197, Art. 2.

[illegible] 433. Cf. REPORT SUPRA, P. 46 — AUDIGIER.]

the households are of minimum size, the strong and effective bonds of kinship are by no means limited to these units. For example, adult brothers maintain very close bonds throughout their lives, and this is often extended to first cousins, especially those on the father's side.

Unified in history, in religion, and in kinship, the people of al-Mansūrī maintain a basically equalitarian society. Although there are individual differences in fortune and capability, there is nothing to suggest a class system. It was made quite clear, for example, that no one would ask or expect a fellow villager to serve him steadily in any work considered menial. Nevertheless, there is work of this sort which is done in the village. There are those who do it live in al-Mansūrī, but they are not of it. Between them and the members of the village there are no kinship ties, either by blood or marriage, and they belong to different religions from that of the village.

These additional inhabitants of the village come to a total of about 51 persons. Thirteen of them consist of house servants and the widows or aged of the laborers. The remainder fall into two groups. The first of these amounts to over 30 people (6 households). These people are all Maronites and they come to al-Mansūrī in the winter only, with their flocks of sheep, goats, and cattle, from two villages which are mentioned at that season. Besides caring for their flocks, the men do wage labor in al-Mansūrī and the women often do laundry. They live either in houses which are vacant in the winter or in the lower levels of occupied houses. The second group totals 13 persons in 3 households. They are very closely related to each other, and are Mitwalī (Lebanese Shī'ites). This group has been in al-Mansūrī only about 12 years, and there was no one like them before that. The men are charcoal burners and use the scrub oak which grows in the village territory. The women do laundry and other chores for the village members.

The presence of these subsidiary groups in the village is a good example of the characteristic Middle East ethnic division of labor at work, emphasized by Carleton Coon.[1] The ethnic distinction in this case is on the basis of religion and place of origin.

Location. It should now be clear that in some respects the traditionally extreme localism of al-Mansūrī has been greatly lessened, while in other respects it remains strong. Herein lies the essence of the conflict which culture change has brought to al-Mansūrī.

On the one hand, modern education and urban jobs (almost all of them related to institutions introduced through Western influence) have drawn a significant proportion of the villagers away from the village and village life in terms of economic activities, general interests, intellectual horizons, and ambitions. This trend is clearly recognized by many of the older people who can remember when conditions were different. A good many of them

[1] Carleton S. Coon, *Caravan: The Story of the Middle East* (New York, 1951).

9: Denton M-S (ca. 1861) 1862
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the palace. Near the residence of the Pasha stands the principal mosque of Belgrade. It is appropriated to the use of the soldiers of the garrison, but is in very bad repair, the plaster having pealed off in large masses from the body of the building, as well as from the minaret by its side. Internally, the whole building is as ruinous as on the outside. Close to the gate which leads into the square stands a tomb, which a former pasha erected to the memory of his daughter, who has the reputation of a saint amongst the Turks. The tomb itself stands in a small apartment with glazed windows; and half a dozen wreaths of flowers strewed on the floor or hanging over the tomb, carried the imagination back to Père la Chaise, and the jet-black immortelles of a French cemetery. Round this and a second quadrangle are barracks for the accommodation of about four thousand men, and in a low irregular building in the main square are, at this moment, confined three hundred and sixty Druse prisoners. Their numbers, however, are fast diminishing: a disastrous fortress, a black hole almost as bad as that of Calcutta, and a sun at times hardly less powerful, are converting their sentence of imprisonment into one of death.

However strongly our sympathies are called forth for the suffering Christians of the Lebanon, I confess that the treatment which the Druse chieftains have received has always appeared a shocking instance of the capricious tyranny and injustice which are found throughout Turkey. These chieftains have but too faithfully complied with the traditions of their country and with the

9: Denton M-S (ca. 1861) 1862
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Lebanon MF1
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Middle East-Turkish Empire MF2

barbarous instigation of the Government, and it is hard that their fidelity should be rewarded with the cruel punishment which they are now suffering merely to enable that same Government to set itself right in the eyes of Christian Europe. Had it not been for the interference of England and France, it cannot be doubted but that the murder of the Maronite Christians would have been tacitly approved or even actually rewarded by the Porte; but the authorities which at first prompted and then connived at the massacre of the Christians, have been allowed to purge themselves by visiting the consequences of their sin upon the heads of the instruments of the wrong. Turkey is governed not by acts of parliament, nor even by the hatti-cherifs and firmans of the Porte, nor by treaties made with foreign powers, but by public opinion and the Koran; and so long as the Koran, which is the very foundation of all authority in Turkey, prescribes or encourages acts of outrage towards unbelievers, it is hard that obedience to its dictates should, in order to satisfy the Western powers, subject men to the cruel and continuous torture under which the Druse chieftains are at this moment groaning and dying.

The government of five of the six fortresses which have been reserved by treaty to the Turks, together with the diplomatic intercourse with the Servian authorities, is at present divided between two Pashas, one of whom, Ashir Pasha, possesses the chief rank and authority, and resides in the palace within the fortress of Belgrade. To him is intrusted the conduct of the

made a determined effort to modernize and strengthen their Empire. Two aspects of this effort are of interest here:

(i) The attempt of Abdul-Hamid II to create a new basis of loyalty to the Empire by reviving the Ottoman claim to the Caliphate. Largely this was undertaken as propaganda for external use, to frighten Europe with the threat of a union of Islamic nations under a single head. Partly also, however, it was an attempt to create for the dynasty a place in the hearts of its subjects, in an age in which the dynastic principle was growing weaker. But it was only its orthodox Moslem subjects who could share in this new loyalty; in an Empire based upon Pan-Islamism and the Caliphate there would be no place for Christians, Jews or even heterodox Moslems who rejected the doctrine of the Caliphate.

(ii) The Sultans tried to "conquer their Empire": to turn it from a group of loosely connected feud, racial and religious units into a military and highly centralized state. The means to this end were various: the abolition of feudalism, the creation of an elaborate bureaucracy and provincial administration, the improvement of communications. Among the tasks which were undertaken, an attempt was made to break down the immemorial local autonomies. The feudal and tribal system of the Kurds was gradually broken down from the early decades of the century onwards. On several occasions Kurdish revolts in defence of their autonomy had to be crushed; the last important uprising was that of Bedr Khan Bey in the eighteen-forties. The Turcoman and Kurd principalities were subdued in the same way in the middle of the century. Towards the century's close, several attempts were made to establish the Imperial authority over Jebel Druze, but with little effective success in spite of the formal submission of the Druzes.

Lebanese Autonomy

In one instance, however, the new policy of destroying the autonomies was a complete failure. In the nineteenth century the autonomy of Lebanon, far from being destroyed, was strengthened and formalized.

The sectarian character of Lebanon, its desire for autonomy, and its organization under feudal lords and spiritual hierarchies were already well established when the Ottoman Sultans conquered Syria. Although the Mountain recognized the sovereignty

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of the Sultan, it preserved its autonomy under hereditary Emirs who paid tribute to the Porte. And although it was frequently afflicted with civil wars, local tyrants and anarchy, it was rarely if ever torn by sectarian strife, until the period of the Shihab Emirs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was then that the rivalry appeared between Maronites and Druses, which grew throughout the reign of the great Emir Bashir (1788–1840), and culminated in the disturbances of 1841 and 1860.

This rivalry was no doubt fed and embittered by religious differences, but its causes were mainly political and social. In part they were external to the life of the Mountain: the general unrest caused by Ibrahim Pasha's invasion of Syria; the international rivalry between France, which supported the Maronites, and Great Britain, which supported the Druses; and the desire of the Ottoman authorities to weaken the autonomy of the Mountain by destroying the tradition of religious tolerance on which it rested. But there were also causes in the Mountain itself. There was growing unrest among the Maronite peasants against their feudal landlords, both Maronite and Druse; this showed itself in North Lebanon in the agrarian revolution of 1859 and the establishment of a short-lived agrarian republic. More important still, there was a gradual shift in the balance of the population: the Maronites were spreading southwards into regions which had formerly been chiefly Druse; the Druses were emigrating to the Hauran, and those who were left feared for their predominance.

In 1860, at the climax of a long period of unrest and growing hatred, the Druses of the Mountain and the Moslems of Damascus killed some thousands of the local Christians. The Powers intervened, and the result of their intervention was the formulation of Lebanese autonomy in the Statute of 1861. This Statute (which was amended and definitively promulgated in 1864) made Lebanon into a self-governing Sanjaq, the territory of which excluded the Mountain but excluded the larger coastal towns. It was ruled by a Christian governor, appointed by the Sublime Porte and assisted by an administrative council representative of the sects. The Sanjaq had its own fiscal system, its own judiciary and its own gendarmerie. The Ottoman authorities had practically no control over its administration.

The system established in 1861 remained in force with no essential change until the outbreak of the Great War, when the

Turks abolished the self-government of the Sanjaq and subjected it to a regime of oppression and exaction. But during the half-century of autonomy, Lebanon enjoyed freedom from civil strife and from Turkish oppression.

The Egyptian Government

In Egypt the line of political development was different. Under Muhammad Ali and his successors the country became even more free of control from Stamboul than it had been before. Their rule was comparatively favourable for the minorities. There was a gradual shift from the concept of theocracy to that of a nationalism which could include Copts as well as Moslems: and the Copts continued, as before, to hold many positions in the Government. The rulers welcomed foreigners who wished to live and work in the country; Armenians, Syrians and others found an official career open to their talents, and vast opportunities in the commercial and financial life of the country. The dynasty was receptive to Western culture, and under its aegis a veneer of Western ideas and refinement spread over the upper classes at least, but the enlightenment was much less profound than it seemed, and beneath the surface Islamic feeling and hatred of the Christian West continued to be strong.

When the British occupied Egypt, they carried further certain tendencies begun by the dynasty of Muhammad Ali. They ensured greater freedom of religious thought and expression, greater equality before the law (although still far from complete equality). They opened the country still wider to foreigners, and they made full use of Eastern Christians as government officials: for example Syrian Christians in both the Egyptian and Sudanese Governments, and a small but important group of Armenians, of whom the most famous was Nubar Pasha. But contrary to what might have been expected, they neither attempted to use the Copts as instruments of government nor gave them in any way a privileged position. Individual Copts co-operated with the British, like Butrus Pasha Ghali, but in general there were fewer Coptic officials under the British than there had been in previous periods.

The Rise of Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire

In the second half of the nineteenth century there appeared a new factor, destined to have great effects, for better or for worse,

MINORITIES IN THE ARAB WORLD

(49) full guarantees for the rights of individuals and communities. Article 9 declared:

> Le libre et consciencieux exercice de toutes les religions, l'libre exercice [illegible] ne soit pas porté atteinte à l'ordre public. Il garantit également aux populations, à quelque rite qu'elles appartiennent, le respect de leur statut personnel et de leurs intérêts religieux.

In addition, Article 10 stated that education was free, provided it did not conflict with public order or morals or touch the dignity of the confessions. There would be no infringement of the right of communities to have their schools, under reserve of the general regulations on public education issued by the State.

Personal Status and Communal Organization

(192) (196) (263) Before the war of 1914-18, certain matters of personal status fell within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts of the millets; while all others were within the competence of the Shariah courts, which were on a higher level than the communal ones. In 1917, at the height of the war, the Ottoman Family Code deprived the Christian and Jewish courts of their jurisdictions, which were conferred on the Shariah tribunals. But this law was never effective and it was annulled in 1921. Soon afterwards the Moslem Shariah courts were placed on a level with those of the other communities by the transfer of all matters of personal status except marriage, divorce, separation, annulment and alimony, to the civil courts. But this measure met with opposition from all sides, and the decree containing it was suspended pending further consideration of the whole subject of personal status.

After several attempts to reform the whole system of jurisdictions had come to nothing, the High Commissioner issued in April 1938 a comprehensive decree defining the position of religious communities. The decree gave explicit legal recognition to the historic communities. Their statutes were given the force of law, and the application of them placed under the protection of the law and the control of the public authorities. They were to enjoy corporate personality, and to be represented in their relations with the public powers by their spiritual heads. Members of the communities would be obliged to conform to their statutes in matters of personal status, and to the civil law

where the statutes of the communities were silent. But anybody who had attained his majority would be at liberty to leave his community and enter a new one. The decree also provided for the recognition of communautés de droit commun, in addition to communities possessing personal statute jurisdiction. They would enjoy certain rights, such as that of acquiring property, but in matters of personal status their members would be subject to the civil law. This last provision was to apply also to individuals who were not members of any religious community.

This decree was opposed by the ecclesiastical authorities; and in December 1936 a new one was issued, modifying it on certain points. For example it was now made clear that in cases of secession, children who were minors would follow their father's confession, even after the father's death and even if the mother had the custody of the children after separation or divorce.

The decree of 1936, like that of 1936, was opposed from many sides, and has not been fully carried out. The position of the religious courts is still undefined and unsatisfactory.

Social Structure of the Communities

There is a considerable difference between the social structure of the different communities. The Maronites are mainly an agricultural community: many of the large estates were broken up in the course of the nineteenth century and a class of freeholds farmers created. As a whole, the standard of life is higher among them than among most other communities, owing to the fertility of their lands and emigration to the New World. In addition to the farmers, there is a large and prosperous bourgeoisie in Beirut. The force which holds together the community is the Church, whose priests, like those of all the Uniate Churches, are more highly educated than those of the independent Eastern Churches: the Patriarch has immense social power, which is, however, challenged by the large land-owning families with feudal traditions.

The Sunni Moslems are almost wholly an urban community, concentrated in Tripoli, Beirut and Saida. They form a great part of the proletariat of these towns, but there is also a Sunni commercial and professional bourgeoisie and some large land-owning families. They have nothing comparable with either the religious or the temporal solidarity of the Maronites, perhaps because they never had the millet organization of Ottoman days.

The Shi'is are mainly peasantry in the southern districts and

to the Bogʿ, although they are also to be found in fields and fur and in the lower strata of the working-class of Beirut. Economically they are the most backward of the communities and are mostly serfs on the estates of semi-feudal lords. In the Bogʿ their lords are largely Sunnis and Christians, but in the south they are mainly Shiʿis, who in the past were practically autonomous; this gives the community a particularly great degree of cohesion.

The Druzes also are mainly an agricultural community, careful farmers, relatively prosperous, and socially the most solidly organized of all the communities. They have a double organization: the religious with its hierarchy, and the feudal with its gradations of ranks. The organization, however, has long been weakened by factional disputes, of which the political rivalry between the great families of Jumblat and Arslan is only the latest phase; and the whole land-system on which it is based is gradually breaking up.

The Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics are partly peasant communities: they contain a large proportion of small freeholders, prosperous through emigration, and in general are less dominated by large land-owners than are other communities. They also form a considerable part of the commercial class of Beirut and other towns, and indeed include some of the wealthiest trading and land-owning families.

The Armenians

There is another community which differs from all those mentioned above by reason of not speaking Arabic and of having come recently into the country: this is the Armenian community.

There are about 70,000 Armenians in Lebanon. They are mostly of recent settlement in the country. A few were established in Beirut before the war of 1914-18, but most of them entered in successive waves during and after it, fleeing from persecution or from the expectation of it, as in 1939 after the cession of Alexandretta to Turkey. Most of them arrived penniless, and settled in huts on the outskirts of Beirut. But in the last two decades, thanks to their own efforts and to those of the Nansen Office, their economic situation and their living conditions have much improved. They are mainly craftsmen, small traders and office-workers; almost all of them are town-dwellers.

Socially they are still a half-isolated community, centred around their churches. They retain to a large extent their own social

customs and their strong sense of family and national solidarity. They cling to their language and maintain their own schools. They have their own charitable organizations, press and cultural life.

They have not always been popular with the Arabs, even with the Arab Christians. Arab nationalists complain that their presence has given rise to an additional minority-problem, and one particularly difficult to solve. Lebanese Moslems regard them as one of the factors making for Christian predominance; and it was been for their immigration the Moslems would now have a majority in Lebanon. They are also disliked for having come into the country destitute and being now prosperous. Being concentrated in a relatively small number of urban callings, they are peculiarly open to attack. But their high standard of morality and culture, their energy and persistence make them a good element in the community and will in time remove the prejudice against them.

Educational Differences

There are considerable educational differences between the sects, which spring in general from the fact that education is mainly in the hands of private organizations, largely confessional, or of foreign missionary societies. This is particularly true of secondary and higher education. The Government maintains no higher institutions, except two normal colleges and one technical school; apart from these, all secondary schools and the two Universities (the American University and the Jesuit Université de St. Joseph) are in the hands of private, mainly religious bodies. In 1938, out of 1,867 primary schools, only 177 were Government schools, while 1,180 were controlled by local and 510 by foreign organizations. Of 102 higher schools, 3 were governmental, 44 local and 75 foreign.

Of the local private schools, by far the greatest number is controlled by the Maronite, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic communities; while the majority of the foreign schools are owned by French Catholic missions. Thus, Lebanese education is predominantly Christian and clerical in spirit and control, and more particularly Catholic.

The proportion of Christian children who attend religious schools as against those who attend Government schools is much greater than the corresponding proportion among Moslems.

Moreover, the total number of Christian scholars is far greater than that of Moslems, particularly in secondary and higher education.

Several conclusions may be drawn from these facts. First, education does nothing to diminish communal differences but rather the opposite, since for the most part it is under communal control. Secondly, the Christian communities are as a rule more highly educated than the Moslems, and this leads to obvious differences in their social and economic structure. Thirdly, the Christians in general are receiving a different kind of education from the Moslems: this is particularly true of the Maronites and other Uniates, who have gone far towards adopting French civilization and the French language as their own.

Christians and Moslems

Apart from the differences between particular sects, there is a general division between Christians and Moslems which is not quite the same as that existing in the neighbouring countries. Lebanon is the only Arabic-speaking country in which the Christians have managed to preserve an autonomous Christian life, both individual and social, and to resist the tendency to moral and social assimilation. This is particularly true of the Maronites, who have never been deprived of connexion with the main body of Western Christendom, thanks to their position on the Mediterranean coast, to their traditional connexion with the French Government and to the work of Catholic missions among them.

The position of the Moslems also is unusual. The Sunnis are outnumbered by Druzes and Shi'is combined, and are thus far from being in a majority or from being able to construct a solid Moslem block, but they still retain to some extent the mentality of a ruling community. As has been mentioned, before the French occupation, the coastal towns in which most of the Sunnis live did not form part of Lebanon, but of the Ottoman vilayet of Beirut; by their transfer to Lebanon they found themselves changed suddenly from a ruling group to one set among many in a State with a largely Christian atmosphere. This is a change which has been difficult for them to accept.

Coastal and Inland Lebanon

Still another significant distinction is that between the old

Republic. At the same time, however, an attempt was made to keep the other sects hopeful and satisfied enough to prevent them trying to break up the Republic. This was done by the careful distribution of posts, large and small, among members of the different sects, and by the encouragement of Lebanese particularist feeling.

Sectarianism in Politics

In a country divided so fundamentally and in so many different ways, it has not been possible to create any genuine sense of solidarity. From its beginning, at least until 1943, the Lebanese Republic was only held together by the control and constant intervention of France; within the framework provided by that control, sectarian feeling maintained and even increased its strength.

The Constitution of the Lebanese Republic, promulgated in 1926, provided for a political organization which should take into account the sectarian divisions of the country. It laid down two principles. The first was that all Lebanese citizens were equal before law, possessed of the same rights and duties, and equally admissible to all public offices, without any distinction (Articles 7 and 12). The other was that, at least provisionally, the confessions should be equitably represented in public offices and in the Ministry, in so far as that did not detract from the welfare of the State (Article 95).

All parts of the political organization of the State show the influence of these principles. Thus the President of the Republic has always been a Christian. To counterbalance this, the Prime Minister has usually been a Sunni Moslem, and the other Ministries have been distributed among the confessions. The Chamber of Deputies, during periods when it has been functioning, has been so composed as to represent the confessions roughly in proportion to their numerical strength; deputies have been elected by their co-religionists, organized for the purpose on a confessional as well as a geographical basis.

In matters of appointments and promotions in the public service, the equitable representation of the sects is a more important consideration than merit, in the minds not only of those who make appointments but also of the public, and more especially of the leaders of the different communities, who watch closely to see that the balance is not overturned.

[illegible] no essential sense a part of the Arab world, but its people constitute a separate nation. It should therefore be an independent State with its face turned towards Europe.

(iv) There are others who try to extract and combine the elements of truth in all these views. They admit that Lebanon is an Arab country by character and by destiny; but they believe that its special traditions confer upon it a special destiny in the Arab world: as a centre of Arab Christian life, as a gateway to the West and as a place where adherents of different religions can meet on absolutely equal terms.

[illegible] Speaking generally and with large reservations, one may say that the first idea is held mainly by Sunni Moslems; the second by Moslem Arab nationalists and those Christians who believe that a lay nationalism is possible and desirable; the third by members of all minorities, particularly among the older generation; the fourth mainly by Maronites and other Uniates; and the fifth by Christians who want to remain fully Christian while being fully Arab nationalists.

These differences of conception involve different points of view on various particular issues:

(i) The question of the frontiers of Lebanon. In general, those who regard Lebanon as a separate entity have wished to preserve the frontiers of 1920, since otherwise it would be even less defensible and economically self-supporting than at present. The adherents of the first two views on the contrary have wished to return to the frontiers of the old Sanjaq, possibly with the addition of Beirut.

(ii) Many of those who regard Lebanon as an independent country or as a refuge wish it to be under the protection of a Western Power which will take in it an interest which is more than political. For most of them that Western Power must be France, but there are others who would prefer Great Britain or the United States. Those who regard Lebanon as in any sense a part of the Arab world, however, consider such protection too dangerous both for Lebanon and for the Arab world to be permitted.

(iii) A great many of those for whom Lebanon is a separate country recognise nevertheless that she must have a close connexion with Syria and other Arabic-speaking countries; but they insist that it must be based upon formal equality. The other countries must recognise the independent existence of

69: Lebanon S-4 (no date): 950 AE: Middle East
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CHAPTER IV

LEBANON

Of all the Arab League countries, Lebanon was the most reluctant to take part in the recent outbreak of anti-Jewish persecution. It was also the first member-nation of the Arab League to restore normal conditions after the conclusion of the armistice with Israel and to abolish restrictions which had been imposed upon the Jews during the fighting.

Lebanon differs from the rest of the Arab countries in a number of ways. First, there is no Muslim majority. Its population is composed of a number of minority groups, none of which individually constitutes a clear majority. The Muslims, both Sunni and Shia, together number only about 967,000, against approximately 600,000 Christians (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Armenian, etc.) and 77,000 Druses. The latest census — held in 1946 — gives the number of Jews as 6,293, a figure probably increased since then by the steady influx of Jews from Syria to something over 6,700.

A number of Christian Arabs in Lebanon have, it is true, played an important part in the revival of Arab nationalism, mostly in the field of literature. But this has not prevented the Christian community as a whole from regarding the movement with a certain feeling of uneasiness. Albert Hourani (*Syria and Lebanon*, Oxford, 1946, p.126) describes the uneasy relations between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon as follows:

> Arabism has not yet determined its relationship with Islam. Thus there is a tendency for many of the nationalists, although not their more thoughtful leaders, to regard members of the minorities as imperfect Arabs because they are not Muslims, or not Muslims as well; equally there is a tendency among the minorities to be suspicious of nationalism as a movement for introducing Sunni Muslim domination.

Apart from the tendency of the greater part of the Arab nationalist movement to rely on Islam as a rallying cry, its generally anti-Western orientation has provided a further obstacle to whole-hearted support in the country. For no country in the Middle East has taken as easily to Western civilization as Lebanon.

The fact that so high a proportion of its inhabitants are Christians has always made it a specially fruitful field for Western educational missions. The French *Mission Laïque* and the American University at Beirut have both played an important part in raising the general level of education, and there is scarcely a middle-class family in

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Lebanon that has no relatives in the United States, France, or some other Western country.

Lebanon joined the Arab League, very hesitatingly, because it wanted the League's support in its campaign for complete independence from France.

Typical of Lebanese uncertainty in support of Arab nationalism is the fact that the Maronites, who number 328,000 and are the largest single group in the country, have never shown opposition to the Zionist Movement in Palestine. Both the Maronite Archbishop of Beirut, Mgr. Ignatz Mouhar, and the Maronite Patriarch have even, in the past, welcomed the progress and civilization which the Jews have brought to the Middle East.

The Lebanese Jewish community is mostly concentrated in the capital, Beirut, with a smaller number living in Tripoli in the north, and in Tyre and Sidon, in the south. They are as deeply rooted in the country as any other group, the first Jewish settlements dating back to biblical times. Like the Christian population, they have gladly accepted the influence of Western civilization. Most of them are bilingual in Arabic and French. For many years they have suffered no restrictions in either commerce or the liberal professions, and thus form a fair proportion of the middle class, some Jews holding high positions in the Government service. Jews are not confined to any special area, though most of the poorer Jews live in streets which, in former times, used to be a Jewish quarter.

As a member of the Arab League, Lebanon found itself willy-nilly bound to take part in the invasion of Israel. Once the fighting in Palestine had started, the Government was forced to apply security measures similar to those introduced in all countries of the Arab League.

All foreign Jews, including the students at the American University and the French college, were ordered to leave the country in January, 1948. When military operations started in May, 1948, about 200 political suspects were arrested. According to a Reuter message sent from Beirut at that time, however, they included only a few Jews.

The hysterical Jew-baiting which then broke out throughout the Muslim Arab countries naturally affected also Lebanese Muslims. On May 15, an anti-Jewish demonstration assembled in the early hours and a mob, armed with bricks, incendiary bombs, and whips, proceeded towards the Jewish quarter. The President of the Jewish community received a telephone call from the head of the Christian Arab community, suggesting the Jews should take steps to guard their houses.

When the mob reached the Jewish quarter, they were halted by guards who had been posted there by the Christian Arab community. At the request of the President of the Jewish community, the authorities sent armed troops, who prevented the rioters from entering the quarter.

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Only one large shop—the joint property of three Muslims and one Jew—was damaged.

There were only a few incidents during the months of fighting in Palestine. On one occasion alone were there casualties—when a bomb thrown at the school of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* injured a few Jews.

When, during the operations in Galilee, large numbers of Arab refugees entered the country, and Israel forces occupied some territory in Southern Lebanon, Muslims in the Sidon area seized Jewish-owned buildings and installed refugees therein. After some days, however, the Government ordered the police to provide protection for the Jews and to restore the buildings to their owners. Jews were not allowed to leave the country, but special permits were issued for travelling to Syria on business.

On the advice of well-disposed Government officials, the Jews did all they could to keep quiet and to escape notice. The wish to avoid any offence led the Jewish newspaper *Al-Alam al-Israeli* (The World of Israel) to change its name to *Al-Salam* (Peace). On the other hand, the Jewish community had to yield to the pressure of public opinion, and to contribute considerable sums towards the Arab Palestine Fund; the total amount is estimated to be not less than £L500,000 (about £55,000). Yet things never reached the stage where they could not carry on their occupations; and the merchants among them were always able to keep their businesses running.

As soon as the fighting was over, the Lebanese Government was the first to restore normal conditions for the Jewish population. The ban on travelling abroad was lifted, and a number of senior Jewish officials who had been dismissed were reinstated, some even being promoted. Nine Jews who had fled to Lebanon from Iraq (where they had been sentenced to death *in absentia*) and three other Jews, who had previously lived in Palestine, were permitted to leave the country for Israel.

There is every evidence that with the return of normal relations with Israel, the Jewish minority in Lebanon will enjoy again the freedom, the full and equal rights, and the friendly relations with their neighbours which existed before the invasion of Palestine.

11: Hourani 5-4 (no date) 1968 MDI Syria MSS LSE and AGI

Uniate Churches: that is, those Churches whose members formerly belonged to one or other of the non-Catholic Churches, and at some time in the past acknowledged the papal supremacy and gave up doctrines which the Roman Catholic Church regards as heretical, but retained their own liturgies and certain distinctive features of discipline and organization. There are five Uniate Churches with important bodies of adherents in Syria and Lebanon: the Greek Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Armenian Catholic and Chaldaean Catholic Churches, which split off from the Greek Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox and Nestorian Churches respectively; and the Maronite Church, which originally held the Monotheiete doctrine that Christ has two Natures but one Will, and which returned to Rome finally and as a whole in the twelfth century. The Maronites, like the Syrian Orthodox and Assyrians, have a Syriac liturgy, and a Patriarch of Antioch, resident in Lebanon, as their spiritual head. There are comparatively few Roman Catholics of the Latin or Western rite.

(v) The Protestants are the fruits of the labours of American and other missionaries during the nineteenth and present centuries.

The Jews are mainly Arabic-speaking and long-settled in the country.

4

Of these religious communities, the Armenians (Orthodox and Catholic), the Assyrians and some of the Syrian Orthodox and Catholics are not Arabic-speaking and have, for the most part, come recently into the Levant States. The Armenians came originally from the Caucasus and have their own language and national traditions. Most of those now resident in Syria and Lebanon have entered the country during the last half-century, in consequence of the great massacres in Asia Minor (1895–1915), and more recently of the annexation of Alexandretta by Turkey.[1]

Most of the Assyrians have been settled in Iraq since the

[1] See Chapter XI.

last war, when they were dislodged from their original homes in the Kurdish mountains; the Chaldaeans have lived in the Mosul area of Iraq for many centuries. In 1933 a period of tension between a section of the Assyrians and the Iraqi Government ended with the killing of some hundreds of them by Iraqi troops. Several thousands in consequence crossed the frontier into Syria, and although some of them later returned to Iraq, others were settled in the Jazirah with assistance from the League of Nations. Their settlement became an integral part of the Syrian State in 1942.

A large part of the Syrian Orthodox and Catholics still speak Syriac. They have been settled since before the coming of Islam in north Syria and south Turkey, in and around the Taurus hills, against which the wave of Arab influence exhausted itself. Thus they have been able to preserve their Syriac dialect which farther south has been replaced almost everywhere by Arabic. Many are, however, bilingual in [91] Arabic and Syriac, and others have abandoned Syriac and are now Arabic-speaking.

There are certain other groups which resemble the Armenians and Assyrians in not being Arabic-speaking, but unlike them are orthodox Moslems. The most important of them are:

(i) The Kurds, of whom there are perhaps 200,000.[1] They are mountaineers from the high country which links the Anatolian and Persian plateaux, and speak a dialect akin to Persian. Some of them have long been resident in the country, but others have emigrated in the last twenty years from their homes in the mountains of eastern Turkey, in order to escape the repressive measures of the Turkish Government. There are small numbers of Kurdish-speaking Yazidis, Alawis and Christians, but most of those who speak Kurdish as their native language are Sunnis.

(ii) The Turcomans, who number perhaps 30,000. They came originally from Central Asia, and their language is a dialect of Turkish. Originally nomads, they have now become semi-sedentary or wholly sedentary cultivators of the soil.

[1] These figures are only rough estimates; there are no official statistics for national and racial minorities.

11: Nearest 5-4 (no date) 1968 MDI Boris Arch/ LEBANON FIL 1

(iii) The Circassians, who are by origin Moslems from the Caucasus. They fled from their homes after the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in the nineteenth century, and were settled by the Ottoman Government along the western edge of the Syrian Desert, to prevent the encroachments of the tribes. There are about 10,000 of them.

(iv) There are also a number of Yazidis, adherents of a secret dualistic religion and with a dialect of their own; but they are only a small offshoot of the main community in Iraq.

With these exceptions the minorities are Arabic-speaking and have lived in Syria and Lebanon for many generations; akin to the majority in many things, their basic difference is one of religious loyalties.

The general nature of the problem which they raise can be stated briefly. It is a product of two factors: first, of certain traditional differences which linger on in a new age; secondly, of the varying relations of the different elements in the population to the process of Westernization.

Serious at any time, religious differences were made more serious in the past by the prevalence of the theocratic view of life; differences of religious belief involved different political loyalties and principles of social conduct. The theocratic view was the basis of the 'millet-system', which, while it allowed certain autonomy to the minorities, also increased the completeness of their separation from one another and from the majority. This was particularly true of those minorities of which a large proportion lived compactly in a single area; they came to regard themselves, if they had not always regarded themselves, as a 'peculiar people' linked by no moral or political tie with their neighbours. To complete their isolation there was added the memory of injustices, real or imagined, which they had suffered at the hands of the majority.

The persistence of these divergences in the present age adds a new and complicating factor to the problem of Westernization. It is not only that different communities have different paths to tread if they are to Westernize themselves: for example, the problems of social organization

11: Hourani 8-4 (no date) 1968 MDI Syria Lebanon 401

held only by Christians: the fourth by many of the Maronites, the fifth by those who have been moved by the nationalist sentiment without trying to make it a substitute for religious belief.

Probably the majority of French missionaries and officials in the last generation have professed the third or fourth views: that is to say, they have regarded Arabism as primarily an Islamic movement in which the Christians can have no place, and thus they have tried to make Lebanon into a place where the Christians can at least be safe and can perhaps even build up a national life of their own. Their attitude is determined partly by religious belief, partly by a sense of France's historic obligations and partly by a certain conception of French interests. As for the third party to the question, the Arab nationalists in Syria and the other Arab countries, they believe that Lebanon is a part of the Arab world and are afraid of its being used as a centre for foreign intrigues against them; but the more reasonable and responsible of them recognise the peculiar traditions and needs of Lebanon and are prepared to make special provision for them.

8

The problem of the Shi'is is in some ways similar to that of the Christians and Druses of the Mountain, since it arises from distinct religious loyalties complicated by a separate tradition and memories of persecution. But there is also another complicating factor: the backwardness of the Shi'is in social organization and their low standard of living. Their first need is for a reformed social organization and improved economic conditions. Once this need has been satisfied, it is possible that their outlook and feeling will be near enough to that of the Sunnis to make special treatment unnecessary.

There is one community which possesses a special relation to all the rest. The Armenians, whether Gregorians, Catholics or Protestants, have two characteristics which distinguish them from the remainder of the population of Lebanon. First, they are not Arabic-speaking, but have their own language, culture and national consciousness. Secondly, they are mainly of recent settlement there. The majority established themselves in and around Beirut in consequence of the measures taken against them by the Turkish authorities

11: Houran 3-4 (no date) 1946 MDI Syria

during and after the war of 1914–1918; and a large number entered the country even more recently, in 1939 after the cession to Turkey of the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, where many Armenian refugees from Turkey had settled. Most of the Armenians arrived penniless and were dependent in the beginning upon international relief organizations, but in the last twenty years their economic situation has greatly improved. They are mainly craftsmen and small traders and almost all are now town-dwellers.

Foreign in language and appearance and socially half-isolated, they have not always been popular with the inhabitants. Some nationalists disapprove of them because they are still unassimilated and because they have added another minority problem to those already existing. Their competitors accuse them, as minorities in their position are often accused, of depressing the level of wages and of monopolizing the trades and crafts to which they have applied themselves.

These Armenians have several alternative conceptions of their future as a nation. There are some, mainly those who have made good, who are prepared to live permanently in Lebanon as a minority; in order to make this possible they wish the Armenians to learn Arabic, to prove themselves good citizens and to co-operate with the bulk of the population in matters of common interest, but at the same time to retain their Armenian characteristics and loyalty. Probably the majority of the Armenians however regard their residence in Lebanon as a temporary exile, and hope sooner or later to return to their own country. Of these, the Tashnak party wish to see their country once more an independent national state, while the Communists and others accept the incorporation of Armenia in the U.S.S.R. and are eager to return and become Soviet citizens. Both these parties recognize that their exile although temporary may be long and that therefore an interim policy is necessary. Some of the Tashnak have tried to follow the example of the Maronites and throw themselves upon a foreign protector; but very many of their party, and all the Communists, desire to reach a *modus vivendi* with the political forces among the Arabs, either with the Arab nationalists or else with the Arab Socialists and Communists.